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Rationale: Stimulation of serotonin 2A (5-HT2A) receptors by lysergic acid diethylamide
(LSD) and related compounds such as psilocybin has previously been shown to increase
primary process thinking – an ontologically and evolutionary early, implicit, associative,
and automatic mode of thinking which is typically occurring during altered states of
consciousness such as dreaming. However, it is still largely unknown whether LSD
induces primary process thinking under placebo-controlled, standardized experimental
conditions and whether these effects are related to subjective experience and 5-HT2A
receptor activation. Therefore, this study aimed to test the hypotheses that LSD
increases primary process thinking and that primary process thinking depends on
5-HT2A receptor activation and is related to subjective drug effects.
Methods: Twenty-five healthy subjects performed an audio-recorded mental imagery
task 7 h after drug administration during three drug conditions: placebo, LSD (100 mcg
orally) and LSD together with the 5-HT2A receptor antagonist ketanserin (40 mg orally).
The main outcome variable in this study was primary index (PI), a formal measure of
primary process thinking in the imagery reports. State of consciousness was evaluated
using the Altered State of Consciousness (5D-ASC) rating scale.
Results: LSD, compared with placebo, significantly increased primary index (p< 0.001,
Bonferroni-corrected). The LSD-induced increase in primary index was positively
correlated with LSD-induced disembodiment (p < 0.05, Bonferroni-corrected), and
blissful state (p < 0.05, Bonferroni-corrected) on the 5D-ASC. Both LSD-induced
increases in primary index and changes in state of consciousness were fully blocked
by ketanserin.
Conclusion: LSD induces primary process thinking via activation of 5-HT2A receptors
and in relation to disembodiment and blissful state. Primary process thinking appears
to crucially organize inner experiences during both dreams and psychedelic states of
consciousness.
Keywords: LSD, ketanserin, 5-HT2A receptor, mental imagery, primary and secondary process thinking, primary
emotions, cognitive bizarreness, healthy subjects
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INTRODUCTION
There is now accumulating evidence (Sloman and Steinberg,
1996; Evans, 2008; Shanks, 2010) confirming and extending
the early meta-psychological theory of Freud (Pribram and
Gill, 1976) which posits that there exist two distinct modes of
psychic functioning: primary process and secondary process. It
is broadly believed that in normal adults, secondary process
is a hierarchically higher-level cognitive mode which fulfills
an adaptive, reflective, rule-bound function (“reality principle”
in Freudian terms) and thus inhibits lower-level, automatic,
motivation- and emotion-driven primary process (“pleasure
principle” in Freudian terms) (Arminjon, 2011). Under altered
psychophysiological conditions such as dreaming, hypnosis,
meditation, sensory deprivation, respiratory maneuvers, trance,
psychosis, and epilepsy, primary process may become the
prevailing cognitive mode (Barr et al., 1972; Vaitl et al., 2005;
Hermle and Kraehenmann, 2017). Primary process thinking can
be operationalized and reliably assessed using formal linguistic
measures such as image fusion; unlikely combinations or events;
sudden shifts or transformations of images; and contradictory
or illogical actions, feelings, or thoughts (Rapaport, 1950; Holt,
1956; Auld et al., 1968; Shevrin, 1996; Sloman and Steinberg,
1996; Brakel et al., 2000).
Previous studies (Landon and Fischer, 1970; Martindale and
Fischer, 1977; Natale et al., 1978; Spitzer et al., 1996; Family
et al., 2016; Kraehenmann et al., 2017) indicate that classical
psychedelics such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and related
compounds such as psilocybin activate mental processes which
are closely related to primary process, such as vivid, dreamlike
imagery, basic emotions, and bizarre thinking. For example,
early linguistic studies (Landon and Fischer, 1970; Martindale
and Fischer, 1977; Natale et al., 1978) investigated the effects
of psychedelics on thought content using primary process
dictionaries. They found that psychedelics acutely increase
frequency of primary process words in subjective reports of
healthy subjects. Moreover, recent studies (Spitzer et al., 1996;
Family et al., 2016) showed that psychedelics enhance access
to remote and non-obvious associations in tasks where subjects
have to rely on automatic, intuitive and uncontrolled thinking.
Finally, we (Kraehenmann et al., 2017) recently investigated the
effects of LSD on imagery reports of healthy subjects. We found
that LSD increased cognitive bizarreness, a formal measure of
dreaming cognition, via activation of the serotonin 2A (5-HT2A)
receptor. Taken together, previous research on the effects of
psychedelics on thought processes indicate that psychedelics may
shift cognition toward primary process thinking.
However, it is still largely unknown whether LSD induces
primary process thinking under placebo-controlled, standardized
experimental conditions, and whether these effects are related
to subjective experience and 5-HT2A receptor activation.
A better understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying
psychedelic states of consciousness is important, especially given
that there is accumulating qualitative evidence (Gasser et al.,
2015; Belser et al., 2017; Watts et al., 2017) indicating that the
therapeutic effects of psychedelics may be mediated by their
acute effects on subjective experience. Therefore, in this study,
we compared the post-peak effects of LSD, placebo and LSD after
pre-treatment with the 5-HT2A receptor antagonist ketanserin
on primary process thinking in mental imagery reports of healthy
subjects. Primary index (PI), a formal measure of primary process
thinking (Stigler, 2001; Frick et al., 2008), was used as primary
endpoint in this study. We hypothesized that LSD would increase
PI in verbal imagery reports. We further hypothesized that
ketanserin would block the effects of LSD on PI and subjective
experience. Finally, given the relative novelty of the primary
endpoint variable (PI) in the field of cognitive neuroscience, we
performed multiple correlation analyses to quantitatively assess
the relationship between PI and other more common measures
which had been frequently used to assess psychedelic-induced
changes in state of consciousness, using a short version of the
Altered State of Consciousness (5D-ASC) self-rating scale; ratings
of mental imagery experience, using visual analog scales (VASs);
and dreaming cognition, using cognitive bizarreness (BD) in the
mental imagery reports.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study Design
The study followed a double-blind, placebo-controlled, within-
subjects, crossover design that involved three experimental
sessions in balanced order. The washout periods between sessions
were at least 14 days. This study was carried out in accordance
with the recommendations of the Declaration of Helsinki and
International Conference on Harmonization Guidelines in Good
Clinical Practice (ICH-GCP). All subjects gave written informed
consent. The protocol was approved by the Cantonal Ethics
Committee of Zurich. The administration of LSD in healthy
subjects was authorized by the Swiss Federal Office for Public
Health, Bern, Switzerland.
Participants
Twenty-five healthy subjects (19 men, 6 women; mean age± SD:
25 ± 4 years; range: 20–34 years) participated in the study.
Subjects had to be physically and mentally healthy. Exclusion
criteria were pregnancy, poor knowledge of the German
language, history of alcohol or illicit drug dependence, and
previous significant adverse reaction to a psychedelic drug. Nine
of the 25 subjects had prior experience with classic psychedelics
(number of subjects: psilocybin 6, LSD 3, LSA1 1, DMT2 1,
2C-E3 1).
Study Procedures
The mental imagery task from this study has been described in
detail elsewhere (Kraehenmann et al., 2017). Briefly, the 30-min
task followed the mental imagery method developed by Leuner
(1969) and was performed 7 h after drug treatment, during the
descending phase of the acute effects of LSD (Dolder et al.,
2015). The task was conducted in an esthetic living-room-like
room located in a tranquil side wing of the research department.
Mental imagery reports from the subjects were audio recorded
and transcribed for statistical analysis.
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Study Drug
In each of the three experimental sessions, subjects first
received pre-treatment, followed by treatment after 1 h. The
drug conditions were LSD (placebo + 100 mcg LSD orally),
Ket+LSD (40 mg ketanserin + 100 mcg LSD orally), and Pla
(placebo+ placebo orally).
MEASURES
State of Consciousness and Mental
Imagery Experience
Subjective state of consciousness at the time of the mental
imagery task (390 min after drug intake) was evaluated using a
short version of the Altered State of Consciousness (5D-ASC)
rating scale (Studerus et al., 2010) for spiritual experience,
blissful state, disembodiment, elementary imagery, and changed
meaning of percepts. Mental imagery experience was evaluated
using visual analog subscales (VASs) for visual vividness,
emotional arousal, positive emotions, negative emotions, insight
and relaxation.
To assess the relationship between primary process thinking
and dream mentation, we included cognitive bizarreness (BD)
in the multiple correlations analysis of this study (cognitive
bizarreness is a standardized formal measure of dream mentation
and had been calculated from the mental imagery reports of this
study sample (N = 25) elsewhere, see Kraehenmann et al., 2017).
Primary and Secondary Process Thinking
The main outcome measure in this study was primary index
(PI), a formal measure of primary process thinking which
had been previously used in text-analytical studies on primary
process thinking and mental imagery (Stigler, 2001; Frick et al.,
2008). PI was calculated by dividing the relative frequency of
primary process (PP) scores by the sum of primary process
and secondary process (SP) scores in the imagery reports
(PI = 100 × PP/(PP+SP)) (Stigler, 2001). The relative frequency
of PP and SP scores was calculated by dividing the PP and SP
scores by the number of words in the reports.
Primary process was evaluated using the rating scale of
Auld et al. (1968), a comprehensive scale for measuring
primary process thinking. The scale consists of nine PP
categories (condensation, unlikely combinations or events,
fluid transformations, visual representation, symbolism,
contradiction, magic occurrences, inhibited movement, taboo
sexual and aggressive acts) which sum up to the PP score.
Examples for PP items from our study subjects: “. . .a cat is
coming from the right side. The cat has huge blue and luminous
eyes. . .the eyes look upward, then down, left, right, always
alternating, like a cuckoo clock with moving eyes. . .now she
has turned into a wooden clock hanging on a wall”; “I am part
of a metal plate. . .I am fusing with the metal plate. . .I am now
a part of this plate. . .it feels like being a liquid. . .I am only
existing in certain parts of my body. . .The whole room rolls
itself and suddenly, everything is dark. . .I can only see flickering
light and two-dimensional faces”; “I see two entangled persons,
like an art painting. . .when I approach the two persons, they
form an ugly bulb and dissolve into bubbles. . .now I see a
huge mouth with yellow teeth. . .the mouth snaps and draws
everything in.”
Secondary process was evaluated using a modified version
(Natale et al., 1979) of the rating scale of Weintraub and Aronson
(1969), a comprehensive scale for measuring secondary process
thinking. The scale consists of seven SP categories (non-personal
reference, negators, qualifiers, retractors, explaining, expressions
of feeling, evaluators) which sum up to the SP score. Examples
for SP items from our study subjects: “. . .the room has got
a bed. The bed is covered with a blanket protecting the bed
from dust, I suppose. The bed is adorned with two or three
carefully arranged pillows - this looks beautiful. . .”; “It is a little
brook with trees along the banks. . .actually, the water is really
cold. . .it feels good. . .the water is indeed cold as ice and it is
freezing, but because I only dip my feet in the water, it is an
extremely good feeling, vitalizing. . .”; “. . .it is not such a special
house. . .it has a roof, a balcony, windows, a garden. . .in front
of the house there is scrub, plants. . .and a green meadow. . .the
meadow is not so beautiful, doesn’t look quite as well cared for as
it should. . .”.
STATISTICS
The statistical analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics
23 software (IBM, Chicago, IL, United States). Repeated-
measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted
to compare the drug effects in LSD, Ket+LSD, and Pla
conditions. Significant main effects or interactions in the
ANOVAs were followed by Bonferroni-corrected post hoc
pairwise comparisons with a significance level of p < 0.05 (two-
tailed test). Bonferroni-corrected Spearman multiple correlations
(Bonferroni-corrected alpha = 0.05/12 = 0.0042) were used to
quantify the relations between the LSD-Pla difference scores
for primary index (1PI), state of consciousness (15D-ASC),
mental imagery experience (1VAS), and cognitive bizarreness
(1BD).
RESULTS
State of Consciousness and Mental
Imagery Experience
Lysergic acid diethylamide significantly changed state of
consciousness, as indicated by a significant main effect of drug
[F(2,48) = 89.42, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.79) in a repeated-measures
(drug × subscale) ANOVA on 5D-ASC score at T3. There
was also a significant main effect of subscale [F(4,96) = 17.63,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.42] and a significant drug × subscale
interaction [F(8,192)= 16.01, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.40]. Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed a greater score
on all five 5D-ASC subscales in the LSD condition than in the
Pla and Ket+LSD conditions (all p < 0.05). Scores did not
differ between the Pla and Ket+LSD conditions for any 5D-ASC
subscale (all p = n.s.), indicating that ketanserin pre-treatment
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completely blocked all LSD-induced effects (Supplementary
Figure S1).
Lysergic acid diethylamide significantly changed subjective
mental imagery experience, as indicated by a significant main
effect of drug [F(2,48)= 8.57, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.26] in a repeated-
measures (drug × subscale) ANOVA on the retrospectively
administered VAS for mental imagery experience. There was
also a significant main effect of subscale [F(2.86,68.71) = 55.23,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.70] and a significant drug × subscale
interaction [F(5.58, 133.86) = 3.21, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.12].
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed
greater VAS score on the vividness and emotional arousal
subscales in the LSD condition than in the Pla condition
and on the vividness subscale in the LSD condition than in
the Ket+LSD condition (all p < 0.05). VAS score did not
differ between the Pla and Ket+LSD conditions for any VAS
subscale (all p = n.s.), indicating that ketanserin pre-treatment
completely blocked all LSD-induced effects (Supplementary
Figure S2).
Primary and Secondary Process Thinking
Lysergic acid diethylamide significantly increased primary
process thinking, as indicated by a significant main effect of
drug [F(1.07,25.70) = 50.63, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.6] in a one-way
repeated-measures ANOVA on PI; and Bonferroni-corrected post
hoc comparisons revealing significantly greater PI in the LSD
condition than in the Pla and Ket+LSD conditions (all p< 0.001).
PI did not differ between the Pla and Ket+LSD conditions
(p = 0.07), indicating that ketanserin pre-treatment completely
blocked the effect of LSD on PI (Table 1). Furthermore, the LSD-
induced increase in PI was driven by an increase in PP, and not
by a decrease in SP, as indicated by a significant drug × category
(PP, SP) interaction [F(1.54,36.87)= 13.30, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.32]
in a separate repeated-measures ANOVA; and Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc pairwise comparisons revealing greater PP,
but unchanged SP, in the LSD condition than in the Pla and
Ket+LSD conditions (all p < 0.001). PP did not differ between
the Pla and Ket+LSD conditions (all p = n.s.), indicating that
ketanserin pre-treatment completely blocked the effect of LSD on
PP (Table 1).
Relations between Outcome Variables
There was a significant positive correlation between LSD-induced
change (LSD-Pla difference score) in PI and LSD-induced change
in 5D-ASC scores for the disembodiment subscale (r = 0.61,
N = 25, p = 0.012, Bonferroni-corrected) and for the blissful
state subscale (r= 0.63, N = 25, p= 0.012, Bonferroni-corrected)
(Figures 1A,B). Furthermore, there was a highly significant
positive correlation between LSD-induced change in PI and
LSD-induced change in BD (r = 0.89, N = 25, p < 0.001,
Bonferroni-corrected) (Figure 1C).
DISCUSSION
The main finding of this study was that LSD increased
primary process thinking, a lower-level, automatic, motivation-
and emotion-driven mode of mental organization which is
characterized by image fusion; unlikely combinations or events;
sudden shifts or transformations of images; and contradictory
or illogical actions, feelings, or thoughts (Rapaport, 1950; Holt,
1956; Auld et al., 1968; Shevrin, 1996; Sloman and Steinberg,
1996; Brakel et al., 2000). Specifically, we show that LSD, in
comparison with placebo, increased primary index, a formal
linguistic measure of primary process thinking in the imagery
reports (Auld et al., 1968; Stigler, 2001) (Table 1). Furthermore,
we found that the effect of LSD on primary index was completely
blocked by ketanserin, a 5-HT2A receptor antagonist (Table 1).
Finally, we show that the LSD-induced increase in primary index
was related to LSD-induced disembodiment and blissful state
(Figures 1A,B).
Our finding that LSD acutely increased primary process
thinking is supported by both direct and indirect evidence:
Landon and Fischer (1970), for example, assessed the effects
of low-dose (0.08 mg/kg orally) psilocybin on several linguistic
parameters. It was found that psilocybin decreased sentence
length and syntactic and rhetorical complexity, but increased
linguistic concreteness and stereotypy, consistent with primary
process thinking. Furthermore, Martindale and Fischer (1977)
used content-analytic measures to directly test the hypothesis that
psilocybin (0.08–0.2 mg/kg) induces primary process thinking.
TABLE 1 | Relative frequencies and post hoc pairwise comparisons for primary process, secondary process, and primary index in the three drug conditions.
Relative frequencyg t24 valueh p-valuei
Category Plad Ket+LSDe LSDf LSD > Pla LSD > Ket+LSD Ket+LSD > Pla
PPa 0.0007 0.0012 0.0080 6.40 6.42 1.86
(0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0063) 0.000001∗∗ 0.000001∗∗ 0.07
SPb 0.0451 0.0459 0.0427 −0.97 −1.80 0.35
(0.0128) (0.0105) (0.0110) 0.34 0.08 0.73
PIc 1.3375 2.3237 14.7980 7.26 7.12 2.44
(1.9622) (3.2501) (9.9916) 0.0000002∗∗ 0.0000002∗∗ 0.02
N = 25. aPrimary process. bSecondary process. cPrimary index, 100 × PP/(PP+SP). dPlacebo. eKetanserin. fLysergic acid diethylamide. gMean (SD). hPost hoc paired
t tests, two-tailed. iUncorrected p-value. ∗p < 0.05, Bonferroni-corrected; ∗∗p < 0.001, Bonferroni-corrected (alpha threshold 0.05/9 = 0.0056).
1D-lysergic acid amide.
2N,N-dimethyltryptamine.
32,5-dimethoxy-4-ethylphenethylamine.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Change in disembodiment was related to change in primary
index of mental imagery reports. The scatter plot shows the relation between
the LSD-induced increase in score on the disembodiment subscale of the
5D-ASC (difference between LSD and placebo drug conditions, x-axis) and
the LSD-induced increase in primary index score of mental imagery reports
(difference between LSD and placebo drug conditions, y-axis) (r = 0.61,
N = 25, p = 0.012, Bonferroni-corrected); (B) Change in blissful state was
(Continued)
FIGURE 1 | Continued
related to change in primary index of mental imagery reports. The scatter plot
shows the relation between the LSD-induced increase in score on blissful
state subscale of the 5D-ASC (difference between LSD and placebo drug
conditions, x-axis) and the LSD-induced increase in primary index score of
mental imagery reports (difference between LSD and placebo drug conditions,
y-axis) (r = 0.63, N = 25, p = 0.012, Bonferroni-corrected); (C) Change in
cognitive bizarreness was related to change in primary index of mental
imagery reports. The scatter plot shows the relation between the
LSD-induced increase in cognitive bizarreness score (difference between LSD
and placebo drug conditions, x-axis) and the LSD-induced increase in primary
index score of mental imagery reports (difference between LSD and placebo
drug conditions, y-axis) (r = 0.89, N = 25, p < 0.001, Bonferroni-corrected).
Pla, placebo; LSD, lysergic acid diethylamide.
They showed that psilocybin increased primary process words,
particularly content related to regressive imagery. Moreover,
Natale et al. (1978, 1979) investigated the effects of low to medium
dose LSD (15–100 mcg) on speech patterns of depressed patients
during psychoanalytic sessions. They found that LSD increased
the patients’ use of novel figurative language and of primary
process-related words, respectively, consistent with an increase
in primary process thinking. Furthermore, Barr et al. (1972)
and Holt (2002) investigated the effects of LSD on primary
process responses to the Rorschach projective test. They found
highly significant LSD effects on formal measures of primary
process thinking, including features such as image fusion, fluid
transformations of percepts, autistic logic, logical contradictions,
verbal condensations, loosening of memory, and unlikely
combinations. Finally, recent double-blind, placebo-controlled
studies lend further support to the notion that psychedelics
enhance primary process thinking: Spitzer et al. (1996) for
example, used word-pairs of different semantic distance and
showed that psilocybin increased indirect semantic priming,
i.e., priming for remotely related word-pairs. Interestingly, the
authors interpreted their results as evidence that psilocybin “in
fact leads to an increased availability of remote associations and
thereby may bring cognitive contents to mind that under normal
circumstances remain non-activated.” Similar effects were found
for LSD in a recent double-blind, placebo-controlled study
by Family et al. (2016). Taken together, both our results and
previous evidence indicate that psychedelics induce an altered
state of consciousness which is characterized by primary process
cognition. Our findings are also in line with recent neuroimaging
data: the entropic brain theory (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014), for
example, holds that secondary process (the cognitive mode of
the Freudian “ego”) is coded by default mode network (DMN)
regions and provides top–down predictions to reduce free-energy
associated with the primary process (the Freudian “id”) within
(para)limbic and anti-correlated neural networks, converting
free energy into bound energy. According to the entropic brain
theory, psychedelics induce an “unconstrained,” “high-entropy”
cognitive state whereby DMN activity breaks down, leading to
broadband alterations in resting-state functional connectivity
between regions that show little connectivity in a baseline state.
However, contrary to such cognitive shift models, which
posit that psychedelics decrease secondary process thinking,
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leading to disinhibition of primary process thinking (“ego
regression,” in psychoanalytical terms), our data did not show
a statistically significant effect of LSD on SP, while there was
a significant increase in PP during LSD compared to placebo
(Table 1). These findings seem to suggest that there is no
simple “shift” or “transition” from secondary toward primary
process thinking during psychedelic states: secondary process
thinking during psychedelic states appears preserved, while
there is an increase in primary process thinking. This may
be an important feature distinguishing night dreams from
psychedelic experiences. In fact, a recent neuroimaging study
(Lewis et al., 2017) showed that psychedelics increase rather
than decrease neural activity in cortical areas that are thought
to mediate the features of secondary process thinking, including
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and temporal cortex
(Dresler et al., 2014). Therefore, psychedelic states may be best
conceptualized as hybrid states of consciousness which share
features of both dreaming and waking consciousness. This is
supported by a recent neuroimaging study (Voss et al., 2014)
which showed that dreaming (and hence unaware) subjects
regained self-awareness in their dreams (they became “lucid”)
following frontal low current stimulation of gamma activity
over DLPFC regions. In fact, the close neurophenomenological
similarity between psychedelic states and lucid dreaming
(Kraehenmann, 2017) may shed some light on the therapeutic
potential of psychedelic-induced experiences: they are not
just “epiphenomena” of underlying neuronal oscillations, but
rather induce conscious learning experiences that promote self-
knowledge and psychological insight.
The human brain is a hierarchically organized and
evolutionally layered organ, and this basic structure is reflected
in the cognitive organization of the mind (Montag and Panksepp,
2017). Primary process thinking has been related to neuronal
activation of ontologically early, subcortical and limbic regions
of the brain which code for instinctual drives and primal
affective experiences (Solms and Panksepp, 2012; Montag and
Panksepp, 2017). In addition, previous neuroimaging studies
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2012; Kraehenmann et al., 2015, 2016;
Lewis et al., 2017) indicate that psychedelics such as psilocybin
modulate information processing in both cortical and subcortical
memory and emotion circuits of the brain (e.g., cingulate
cortex, temporal cortex, insula, amygdala, hippocampus). This
is supported by recent receptor binding studies showing a dense
and widespread expression of 5-HT2A/5-HT1A receptors in
both cortical and subcortical areas of the human brain (Beliveau
et al., 2017). This may explain why, in psychedelic states,
basic drives and primary emotions are strongly activated and
substantially influence cognition and behavior (Hermle and
Kraehenmann, 2017). In fact, there is consistent evidence that
psychedelics, especially during drug peak effects, induce high
emotional arousal: “. . .intense, labile, personally meaningful
emotionality is uniformly produced, with periodic episodes
of overwhelming feeling” (Pahnke et al., 1971). Even under
high-dose drug conditions, most subjects describe their imagery
as highly pleasurable and rewarding (“cosmic joy”), coming
along with feelings of “boundlessness” and “unity” (“oceanic
boundlessness”) (Griffiths et al., 2011; Studerus et al., 2011).
Moreover, previous factor analytical studies (Studerus et al., 2010,
2011; Lebedev et al., 2015) support the view that psychedelics
induce altered states of consciousness based on two main factors:
visual imagery on the one hand, and emotionally experienced
alterations in self-awareness and loss of self-/body-boundaries
on the other hand. Taken together, our results are entirely
consistent with this view because LSD significantly induced vivid
imagery on the VAS subscale, blissful state (positively valenced
mood state) and disembodiment on the 5D-ASC subscale
(Supplementary Figure S1).
Recent behavioral (Kometer et al., 2012, 2013; Kraehenmann
et al., 2017) and neurobiological studies (Lebedev et al., 2015;
Preller et al., 2017) may help explain why psychedelics are
such potent modulators of visual imagery, emotions, and self-/
body-awareness. For example, it has been shown that 5-HT2A
receptor activation in the brain is a central mechanism underlying
psychedelic-induced imagery (Kometer et al., 2013), positive
mood states (Kometer et al., 2012), and alterations in the sense of
self and body (Vollenweider et al., 1998). Therefore, our results
are consistent with this view because ketanserin-pretreatment of
LSD completely blocked the observed subjective and behavioral
effects of LSD (Table 1 and Supplementary Figure S1). Given
that 5-HT receptors are widely expressed in the human brain
(Beliveau et al., 2017), they have important functions in
the regulation of mood states, instinctual drives, sleep, and
dreaming (Nichols and Nichols, 2008; Pace-Schott, 2008). In
fact, we (Kraehenmann et al., 2017) have recently shown that
5-HT2A receptor activation by LSD induces dreamlike imagery,
correlating with LSD-induced loss of self-boundaries and
cognitive control. Given that there is a broad phenomenological
and neurophysiological overlap between psychedelic states and
dreaming (Kraehenmann, 2017), and given that primary process
thinking is the prevalent cognitive mode in dreams (Rapaport,
1950; Holt, 1956; Auld et al., 1968; Shevrin, 1996; Sloman and
Steinberg, 1996; Brakel et al., 2000), it is plausible to assume that
5-HT2A receptor activation by psychedelics induces dreamlike
imagery which is related to primary process thinking, emotion
activation, and alterations in the sense of self and body. This is
strongly supported by our results because LSD-induced primary
process thinking was positively correlated with LSD-induced
cognitive bizarreness, a formal measure of dreaming cognition
(Figure 1C), and was related to both LSD-induced blissful
state (Figure 1B) and disembodiment (Figure 1A) on the 5D-
ASC. Finally, this is also supported by previous neuroimaging
studies (Maquet et al., 1996; Braun, 1997; Solms, 2000; Lebedev
et al., 2015) which found that both psychedelics and rapid-eye
movement dreams activate temporal lobe regions, leading to
visual imagery and changes in the sense of self and body.
The close relationship between primary process thinking,
dream-like cognitive bizarreness, imagery intensity and
emotionality during LSD in conjunction with guided mental
imagery relative to guided imagery during placebo implicates
that LSD in combination with mental imagery induces inner
experiences which are different from those produced by either
LSD alone or guided mental imagery alone. Given that mental
imagery and dreams establish privileged access to latent relational
and emotional schemes (Grenell, 2008; Kottje-Birnbacher, 2011),
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LSD and other classical psychedelics might be beneficially used
as add-on pharmacotherapeutics to deepen psychotherapeutic
processes (Kraehenmann, 2017). In fact, early clinical studies
between 1950 and 1970 used LSD in a similar way (Strassman,
1995). Levine and Ludwig (1965), for example, showed that the
combination of hypnosis and LSD produced more profound
alterations in consciousness than either hypnosis or LSD
alone. Future clinical studies could test this hypothesis by
using a study design with several treatment arms comparing
either psychedelics without psychotherapy versus psychedelics in
conjunction with psychotherapy versus psychotherapy alone.
Limitations
We only assessed primary process thinking during the
descending phase of the acute effects of LSD (Dolder et al., 2015).
Therefore, we didn’t measure drug peak-effects, which might
have yielded different results. Nonetheless, we are confident
that peak-effects of LSD on cognition and subjective experience
would turn out to be similar, if not even stronger, than the
observed effects, given that during drug peak, the effects of
LSD were completely blocked by ketanserin, and given that
LSD induced more primary process in subjects which had more
intense subjective drug effects (Figures 1A,B). However, we did
not assess dose-dependency of the effects of LSD on primary
process thinking. Given that a recent neuroimaging study (Lewis
et al., 2017) did not find dose-dependent differences between
brain activation patterns in the acute psychedelic state, and given
that dose-response relationships for psychedelic drug effects are
approximately linear (Studerus et al., 2011), we expect the effects
of LSD on primary process thinking to linearly increase with
increasing dose.
CONCLUSION
We found that LSD, compared with placebo, enhanced primary
process thinking in relation to disembodiment and blissful
state. Our results confirm previous studies which showed
that psychedelics acutely increase primary process thinking.
Furthermore, our results indicate that psychedelic-induced
primary process thinking is closely related to 5-HT2A receptor
activation and the effects on mood state and sense of self and
body. Taken together, we show that psychedelics induce transient,
but fundamental changes in consciousness which otherwise are
only experienced under psychophysiological conditions where
primary process is activated such as in dreams. Finally, the results
of this study may help extend current understanding of the
cognitive mechanisms underlying psychedelic-induced subjective
experience. Future clinical studies may test the hypothesis that
therapeutic efficacy is mediated by the psychedelic-induced
primary process thinking.
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FIGURE S1 | State of consciousness at the time of the mental imagery task. The
graph shows the score on each 5D-ASC subscale in each drug condition at time
point T3 = 390 min after drug intake. LSD increased the score on all five 5D-ASC
subscales. Ketanserin pre-treatment completely blocked all LSD-induced effects
(all p = n.s.). Asterisks indicate significant differences between LSD and placebo
conditions (∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.001, Bonferroni-corrected). 5D-ASC, Altered
States of Consciousness; Pla, placebo; Ket, ketanserin; LSD, lysergic acid
diethylamide.
FIGURE S2 | Mental imagery experience. The graph shows the score on each
visual analog subscale (VAS) in each drug condition. LSD increased VAS score for
visual vividness and emotional arousal. Ketanserin pre-treatment completely
blocked all LSD-induced effects (all p = n.s.). Asterisks indicate significant
differences between LSD and placebo conditions (∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.001,
Bonferroni-corrected). Pla, placebo; Ket, ketanserin; LSD, lysergic acid
diethylamide.
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